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Abstract
The initial wireless phone industry in the United States had many competitors, but due
to mergers and acquisitions the industry has become highly consolidated. This paper
documents the history of the consolidation. More importantly, I use the geographic
path of consolidation to distinguish whether consolidation has been motived by retail
market power or efficiency explanations. One efficiency explanation is that consumers
prefer national coverage areas. I use data on roaming agreements in the early cellular
industry to analyze whether contracts can substitute for roaming agreements. Finally,
in joint work with Patrick Bajari and Stephen Ryan we estimate the consumer valuation
for national coverage areas using plan demand data.
∗Financial support of the NET institute (http://www.NETinst.org) is gratefully acknowledged. Research
assistance has been provided by Edmund Cheng, Charles Kinzer, and Manasi Vydyanath.
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1 Introduction
Many network industries are dominated by a few large firms. This high degree of concen-
tration naturally raises the antitrust concern that firms might have high degrees of market
power, allowing them to charge higher prices for and produce lower quantities of their prod-
ucts than would be socially optimal. Concentration might also occur for efficiency reasons:
larger companies might take advantage of cost-side returns to scale and scope, as well as
the demand side benefits of offering customers larger networks. Economists wish to under-
stand the different roles of increasing efficiency and exploiting market power in explaining
concentration.
This paper seeks to understand the relative roles of efficiency and market power in deter-
mining the concentrated industry structure of the modern US wireless phone industry. I use
three types of data to understand multiple aspects of the reasons for consolidation. First,
I examine the history of consolidation over the past 20 years. Firms can choose to merge
to create national or regional agglomerations of coverage areas, or to increase presence in
individual markets. Increasing a carrier’s presence in a local market in consistent with a
desire to exploit local market power. Second, carriers can create national coverage areas by
signing roaming agreements instead of merging. I examine data on roaming agreements
from the early wireless industry to see if national coverage areas were indeed created. Fi-
nally, efficiency reasons for merging can include both cost-side returns to scale and scope
and demand side benefits from offering customers larger native coverage areas. It is pos-
sible to isolate demand-side efficiency gains by focusing on the behavior of consumers. As
part of joint work with Patrick Bajari and Stephen Ryan, we use data on the preferences of
customers for wireless phone plans to semiparametrically estimate consumer demand for
wireless plan characteristics, especially national coverage areas.
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In most network industries, a major concern with empirical investigation of the different
causes for concentration is that often no variation in industry structure is observed, so the
outcome of industry structure is not an informative dependent variable for distinguishing
between efficiency and market power reasons for the observed concentration. In European
mobile phone markets, typically a regulator issues franchises to a few large companies, en-
suring a concentrated industry structure. If the regulator determines the industry structure,
the industry structure cannot be inverted, using economic theory and a profit maximization
assumption, to recover the preferences of firms over alternative industry structures.
The mobile phone service industry in the United States is highly concentrated: four large,
national carriers currently dominate the industry. However, this high degree of concentra-
tion is relatively recent. At the outset of the industry, the US government issued two licenses
to operate phone service per geographic market, and these licenses were issued to a great
number of companies. The modern state of consolidation occurred through a long history
of voluntary merger and acquisition activity. Thus, the US mobile phone industry allows us
to observe the transition from an unusual unconcentrated industry chosen by a regulator to
a concentrated industry chosen by the voluntary actions of wireless phone carriers. These
voluntary merger and acquisition decisions are indicative of the relative profitability of the
observed industry outcomes compared to structures that are not observed.
The mobile phone industry has a second institutional advantage: competition for new sub-
scribers is local. The US government must issue a geographically-specific spectrum license
to a carrier before it can enroll new subscribers in a particular geographic market. These
licenses are limited in number, and as part of maintaining a license a carrier must operate
a mobile phone network. Therefore, if a firm wants to increase its retail market power, at a
first glance only consolidation with other firms operating in the same city can achieve this
goal. By limiting the number of firms competing for any given customer, firms might in-
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crease market power. By contrast, mergers that occur only across geographic markets will
not limit the choices of any given customer, and should not have first-order impacts on retail
market power.
The first part of the empirical work examines whether consolidation occurred mainly be-
tween firms in the same market or firms in different markets. The US government does not
collect a usable history of the firms controlling each license, although the information is,
strictly speaking, publicly available. I have collected a panel comprising the identity of the
firms controlling each geographic license over the roughly 20 year history of the industry. To
a first approximation, analyzing the geographic pattern of consolidation provides evidence
about whether efficiency based explanations or retail market power is more important in
driving consolidation.
The geographic consolidation analysis cannot identify whether any supposed efficiencies
are on the demand or cost side of the market. Nor does the consolidation analysis address
the theory of the firm: why is it necessary to merge carriers in order to achieve scope and
scale economies? On the demand side, it is technologically easier to offer larger coverage
areas by signing roaming agreements, so that customers can use their phones in markets
not served by their home carriers. Data on roaming agreements were publicly available in
the early cellular industry. I examine this data to see whether demand-side benefits from
national calling areas are likely a major force in explaining consolidation.
A more direct way of estimating the demand-side benefits for calling plans is to use actual
demand data to estimate consumers’ valuations for national calling plans. Modern wireless
carriers offer both regional and local plans. Bajari, Fox and Ryan (2005) develop a new
semiparametric discrete choice estimator that uses aggregate data, and more interestingly
needs only the rank order of market shares, rather than the precise values of market shares,
for estimation. We are able to use calling plan market share ranking data from the website
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Amazon to estimate consumers’ valuations for calling plan characteristics.
The empirical work in this paper complements work by Bajari and Fox (2005) in examining
the behavior of potential wireless carriers in a narrower context: an auction of new geo-
graphic licenses to offer mobile phone service. Bajari and Fox use the revealed preferences
of bidders to estimate whether geographically proximate licenses are complements, mean-
ing that the sums of the payoffs of two licenses won separately are less than the payoffs
of the licenses if won together. Indeed, bidders in the spectrum auction studied did have
strong for creating larger contiguous coverage areas, which is consistent with the presence
of demand and cost side returns to scale and scope. The auction studied offered only one
license per geographic market and no bidders were incumbent carriers, so Bajari and Fox
do not investigate the contribution of retail market power to bidder valuations.
Distinguishing retail market power from efficiency explanations for consolidation has im-
portant policy implications. If retail market power is an important driver of consolidation,
then future merger activity may lower the welfare of consumers. More importantly, the
government continues to issue more geographic licenses. The government can encourage
more exploitation of the returns to scale and scope by targeting these licenses to incumbent
carriers, or can encourage more retail competition by encouraging new entry.
Bajari and Fox (2005) document how implicit collusion in spectrum auctions prevents an ef-
ficient outcome from arising. Therefore, the government can alter the future of the industry
by modifying the attributes of the licenses it auctions. To the extent that the returns to scale
and scope, on both the demand and cost sides, are important, the government can ensure
these returns are captured by issuing larger licenses, in terms of population and land area.
To the extent that retail market power is important, the government can encourage more
competition by auctioning licenses that individually provide access to smaller amounts of
the scare radio spectrum needed to place phone calls.
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Figure 1: Number of Distinct Firms Owning Original Cellular Licenses in the Top 20 US
Markets by 1989 Population
2 History of Consolidation
As of September 2005, Cingular, Verizon, Sprint/Nextel and T-Mobile dominate the wireless
phone service industry in the United States. The industry was not always so centralized.
Figure 1 demonstrates the consolidation of the industry by presenting the number of distinct
firms owning at least one of a balanced panel of the two original cellular licenses awarded
for the Top 20 US geographic markets (for a total of 40 licenses). In 1989, 13 separate firms
together owned the 40 licenses, while at the start of 2005 only three firms control those
licenses, and two of those three, Verizon and Cingular, together own 39 of the 40 licenses.
The initial dispersion of control in Figure 1 can be traced to regulation by the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC). The FCC issues licenses for the exclusive use of blocks
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of radio spectrum in designated geographic markets.1 Between 1982 and 1986, the FCC
planned to use comparative worth regulatory hearings to assign licenses. However, the
FCC did not have the engineering resources to evaluate the many proposals, so the FCC
awarded licenses for smaller cities and rural areas using a passive mechanism: lotteries. The
lottery assignment mechanism attracted entrepreneurs with very little capability to operate
a wireless phone carrier.
The FCC’s licensing schemes created an industry with a large number of players. In a world
without transactions costs, management of licenses should shift to those companies best
capable of operating a wireless phone carrier. The FCC placed few restrictions on the ability
of firms to merge across markets. The most famous aggregator of wireless phone licenses
wasMcCaw Cellular, which grew to a national wireless phone carrier that was sold to AT&T
for $17.3 billion in 1993.
In late 1994, the FCC began a process of auctioning new radio spectrum, the Personal Com-
munication Services (PCS) licenses, for mobile phone use. AT&T Wireless (the former Mc-
Caw) was able to fill in holes in its burgeoning national network, a new national carrier
(Sprint) was created, and the forerunner of another new carrier (today’s T-Mobile USA) en-
tered the industry. Using license ownership data I have collected, Figure 2 computes the
mean number of firms per market (instead of over the top 40 markets, as before) for an
unbalanced panel of all markets with operating cellular phone carriers.2 The mean num-
ber of mobile phone carriers increased dramatically between 1998 and 2000 as the new PCS
carriers came online. Further increases in the number of carriers after 2000 are driven by
a phenomenon known as disaggregation: within a market, firms are allowed to split their
1Spectrum regulation prevents interference from multiple users transmitting on the same radio frequency.
2In 1993, Nextel surprisingly won FCC approval to use licenses it had purchased from paging and taxi dis-
patch companies to provide wireless phone service. Nextel soon became a new national carrier. Nextel and
other companies using converted taxi dispatch licenses are not included in the figure. The new PCS G block
licenses issued to Nextel in 2005 to resolve public safety issues are also not included, as Nextel is not currently
using the new licenses to provide mobile phone service.
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Figure 2: Mean Number of Distinct Firms Operating in a Geographic Market
spectrum blocks either in terms of either the radio spectrum itself or in terms of land area.
Disaggregation primarily occurs for firms needing to raise capital through sales and for
firms with large amounts of excess capacity.3
Figure 2 shows that, using the metric of the number of firms in a market, the entry of new
carriers counteracts the consolidation of incumbents into national carriers. As I will show
later, many new entrants are fringe players with fewer customers. Consequently, the mobile
phone market is much more concentrated when measured using market shares rather than
3Disaggregation is an example of the many sales or trades of licenses between companies that happen out-
side of mergers. These fine-tuning transfers provide evidence about how firms value complementarities. For
statistical purposes, transfers providemany more observations of changes in geographic market control than do
the highly publicized mega mergers.
For the most recent years, Figure 2 exaggerates the number of firms in a typical market. The original two
cellular licenses (permarket) and the later PCS licenses are issued using different geographicmarket boundaries,
and, because of the format of the books that data were collected from, Figure 2 lists the two cellular licenses
and any PCS carriers with licenses that overlap the boundaries of the original two cellular licenses. Thus some
carrier-market observations are double counted (appear inmultiple markets) as the land area of a cellular license
might overlap with two PCS licenses. I am working on ways to minimize the double counting.
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the number of firms. Figure 2 rightly points to the high level of entry spurred by government
spectrum auctions, but does not capture the reality that older incumbents tend to have more
subscribers. In 2003, the major carriers served 125 million of the more than 150 million US
wireless phone subscribers.
The regulated entry encouraged the FCC to raise the amount of spectrum that a company
can own in one market, the spectrum cap.4 The spectrum cap originally limited a carrier to
owning no more than 35 MHz worth of mobile phone spectrum in a given geographic area.
The FCC raised the spectrum cap to 45 MHz in 1996, 55 MHz in 2001, and eliminated the
cap altogether in 2003. Today major companies with much overlap in coverage areas, such
as Cingular and AT&T, can merge.
3 The Private Gains from Consolidation
The dramatic increase in concentration in the short history of the wireless phone service in-
dustry can only be explained by consolidation being in the private interests of the carriers
involved. This paper seeks to distinguish between retail market power and efficiency expla-
nations for consolidation. Efficiency reasons can be subdivided into the returns to operating
scale and geographic scope, and such efficiencies can come from both the supply and de-
mand sides of the mobile phone market. The goal of the analysis of the geographic path of
consolidation is to decompose the reasons for consolidation into retail market and efficiency
explanations. A secondary goal is to distinguish between operating scale and geographic
efficiencies, although again the data on the geographic consolidation alone will not identify
whether these economies arise on the demand or cost side of the mobile phone market.
4The licenses issued in the 1980’s are for 25 MHz worth of spectrum, and the more recent PCS licenses
auctioned in the mid 1990’s were originally for either 30 MHz or 10 MHz.
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The analyses of roaming agreements and demand estimation of the value of national cover-
age areas focus on the demand side of the mobile phone service industry. Roaming agree-
ments allow cooperating carriers to mimic national coverage areas with contracts, and the
incidence and characteristics of these contracts provide suggestive evidence about the im-
portance of national coverage areas to carriers. Finally, structural demand estimates using
wireless subscription data directly measure consumers’ valuations for national coverage ar-
eas.
Consumers’ interest in using their phones while traveling is the most recognized form for
the returns to geographic scope and operating scale. A consumer may care about a carrier’s
total coverage area (scale), but is likely to be more concerned with available coverage and
rates in geographic areas near to where the customer lives, and where there are many people
for the customer to visit. The notion of geographic proximity can be extended to allow for
long-distance travel via air by using data on actual travel between geographic markets.5
Consolidation can also create cost advantages. One can distinguish between economies of
scale and scope. Economies of scale often involve spreading fixed costs over a wider user
base. A carrier serving a market with a greater population (say New York City) will have a
higher scale than a carrier serving only a smaller market. If the two carriers have the same
fixed costs, the larger carrier will have lower average costs. Fixed costs include national
marketing expenses and developing new mobile phone technologies.
Cost-side economies of geographic scope arise from the complementarities between dif-
ferent markets that exceed the economies from just raw size. For example, a carrier that
serves two nearby markets might use one central service center from which service per-
5I treat a carrier owning two or more geographic markets as a multiproduct firm. The term “scope” refers
to a proxy for the potential complementarities between the markets where the firm sells phone service. FCC
market definitions are related to market definitions from the viewpoints of carriers as the FCC chooses market
boundaries using demographic and commercial data.
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sonnel are dispatched to repair cellular towers. The cost savings from the common service
center would not be possible if the carrier provided phone service in two distant geographic
markets.
Firms may also merge so that they can exploit market power by raising prices and lower-
ing joint production. As phone technologies, price plans and coverage areas differentiate
carriers, mergers between competing carriers might encourage firms to increase prices and
therefore reduce the number of mobile phone subscribers. Future governmental regulation
of the industry requires knowledge about whether past consolidation has primarily been
driven by retail market power or efficiency considerations.
Economists traditionally use detailed cost (or its dual, production) data provided by a regu-
lator to estimate the returns to scale or scope in an industry (Caves et al., 1981; Christensen
and Greene, 1976). The FCC does not regulate the price of mobile phone service and does
not collect cost, output and input data from carriers.
A more recent literature, often focusing on less regulated industries, uses the assumption
that the observed actions of firms are profit maximizing to estimate unknown parameters
about the economic environment firms find themselves in (Bresnahan, 1987). This project
takes this revealed preferences approach to distinguishing efficiency from retail market
power explanations.
The available data is on the transfer between firms of ownership of geographic licenses to
provide mobile phone service. A transfer can be a sale of a license or part of a larger merger
that combines all the operations of two firms. If transfers create packages of geographi-
cally or commercially (in terms of air traffic, etc) close markets, this is evidence that there
are returns to geographic scope. Evidence that companies are amassing together otherwise
unrelated but large markets identifies the role of operating scale in firm payoffs and hence
consolidation.
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In the mobile phone market, competition for customers is mainly local, as legally a carrier
must provide wireless phone service in a market to enroll new subscribers there. The extent
to which consolidation reduces the number of providers in individual geographic markets
identifies an upper bound on the role of retail market power in driving consolidation.6 Only
an upper bound on retail market power is identifiable becausewithin-market mergersmight
be motivated by efficiency reasons such as creating a dense grid of retail stores, offering
more capacity to handle demand fluctuations, and reducing overhead in local operations.
A carrier offering its customers a larger coverage area can charge a higher price, which is a
likely outcome of competition as otherwise there might not be any reason to purchase a sub-
scription from a smaller carrier. This relationship between product price and product char-
acteristics is a standard implication of a perfectly competitive hedonic equilibrium (Rosen,
1974). In an oligopoly market, a second-order effect can arise: firms with greater coverage
areas might exploit their market power to raises prices further, as market power is a form of
product differentiation that strategically behaving firms can exploit to earn higher profits.
Thus, the economies of geographic scope, on the consumer demand side, are intertwined
with market power. The demand estimates reported later directly measure consumer valu-
ations, and will eventually provide ways of directly measuring the product differentiation
motive for expanding coverage areas.
Implicit collusion through multi-market contact provides a second concern about distin-
guishing the roles of efficiencies from retail market power in understanding consolidation.
If firms merge primarily across markets, the new national carriers serve many overlapping
markets. These multiple markets may facilitate a collusive regime where attempts to price
more aggressively in one market are punished by price wars in all markets.
6Consolidation also reduces the number of carriers purchasing handsets and infrastructure equipment,
meaning that larger carriers may be able to bargain for lower prices from suppliers. This monopsony power
does not vary at the market level and will be indistinguishable from the technological returns to operating scale
in the data.
12
4 Data on License Ownership
This paper uses the revealed preference approach to distinguish between motives for con-
solidation: firms undertake the mergers and acquisitions that are profitable for all parties
involved, and do not undertake mergers that are not profitable. Here “profit” is a general-
ized notion of economic returns that accommodates transactions costs for the mergers.
The dependent variable is thus the decision to merge, or not. The right-hand side covariates
are the characteristics of the firms before they merge. For this study, a key carrier character-
istic is the set of geographic spectrum licenses that a carrier controls, and the characteristics
of the coverage areas of a hypothetical merged company.
Unfortunately, the US government does not have a easily accessible database of historical
license ownership. However, almost every year in the roughly twenty-year history of this
industry industry analysts have produced directories that list ownership information. I have
collected back issues of these industry directories and have merged them together, creating
a unique panel dataset about license ownership.
License ownership information on the early industry, before 1993, comes from the Cellular
Travel Guide and the Official Cellular Roaming Guide. Information for the from 1993–1998
comes from Kagan’s Cellular Telephone Atlas. Information for 2000 comes from the Prudential
Securities publication “Wireless Market Summary–Licensing.” Information for 2001, 2002
and 2005 comes from Kagan’s Wireless Telephone Atlas. Data for 2003 and 2004 come from
RCR’sWireless Telephone Directory.
Not surprisingly, many judgement calls are needed to integrate the disparate data sources.
Future versions of this paper will document these details in an appendix.
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5 The Geographic Patterns of Consolidation
The path of geographic consolidation is the outcome variable that this project will use
to distinguish between retail market power and efficiency explanations for consolidation.
Consolidation occurs through instances of transfers (sales) of licenses between carriers, and
throughmergers between carriers. The identification of the upper bound on the role of retail
market power in industry consolidation comes from the year-to-year changes in ownership
of geographic markets. There are not enough highly publicized mega-mergers for reliable
statistical inference, but each year there are perhaps hundreds of small transfers of market
control between carriers.
An explanation for the slow pace of consolidation is that merging and undoing mergers
are costly, and due to uncertainty about future industry outcomes, it takes time to decide
that a merger will be in the best interests of the companies involved. Uncertainty includes
whether the FCC will allow new carriers to enter. Regulated entry episodes include the
introduction of Nextel, the PCS spectrum auctions in the mid 1990s, and the forthcoming
spectrum auctions.7
Figure 3 presents the number of geographic spectrum licenses that change hands in any
given year. For each pair of years, only licenses with operating carriers in both years are con-
sidered in the figure.8A mean across years of 25% of geographic licenses change ownership
in any given year.9 These ownership changes reflect both mergers and transfers between
companies. Each year, there are hundreds of changes in ownership not tied to mergers. By
7Not surprisingly, FCC decisions are announced well before they come into force. Legislation authorizing
spectrum auctions was passed by Congress on August 10, 1993. The first broadband PCS auction started on
December 5, 1994.
8I do not have data on all years. The fraction of ownership changes per time gap is divided by the number
of years making up that time gap.
9The fraction of changes between 1996 and 1997 is anomalously low, perhaps because the 1997 source used
older, 1996 data.
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Figure 3: Fraction of Geographic Licenses Changing Ownership by Year
contrast, the large fraction of ownership changes between 2000 and 2001 reflects the creation
of the national carriers Cingular and Verizon throughmergers of earlier carriers. Either way,
Figure 3 shows that there are more than enough transfers of ownership for statistical analy-
sis.
The main purpose of the consolidation study is to distinguish whether retail market power
should be on the table as a major possible explanation for mergers. Consolidation to exploit
retail market power should mainly happen within geographic markets. Unfortunately, I
do not have data on market shares in terms of the number of subscribers. I do have an
alternate measure: the amount of spectrum controlled by a carrier in a market. The amount
of spectrum a firm controls is presumably highly correlated with its number of subscribers
as a firmwith excess spectrum should sell it in a disaggregation, and a firmwill not buy extra
licenses in a market without a projected need for more capacity. I define the market share
of a carrier to be the fraction (in terms of MHz) of the market’s total operating spectrum
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controlled by the firm. With this MHz market share measure, we can construct measures of
concentration, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).10 For reference, a monopoly
market has a HHI of 10,000, and the Department of Justice considers any market with a HHI
above 1800 to be “highly concentrated”.
Figure 4 shows the population weighted mean HHI for each year of the data. There were
only two carriers per market until 1998 and the entry of PCS carriers after the spectrum
auctions. Each duopolist had the same amount of spectrum, so the HHI for the majority of
markets was 5000. With the entry of the new carriers, the mean HHI drops to around 2000
in the year 2000. Since 2000 the FCC has gradually eliminated the spectrum cap preventing
mergers of carriers within the same market. Consequently, major carriers with overlapping
portfolios, such as AT&T and Cingular, have merged.11 By 2005, the mean HHI is above
6000. By the HHI measure, local mobile phone markets are more concentrated today than
when there were only two companies equally splitting each market. In many cases, the
early duopolists became AT&T and Cingular, and with the merger the new Cingular has
dominant market shares in many local markets.
6 Roaming Agreements as a Substitute for Mergers
Inter-firm contracts may achieve the benefits from market power and the returns to scale
and scope that mergers are thought to accomplish. Coasian logic suggests that firms will
sign profit-enhancing agreements in the absence of transactions costs. The assignment of
geographic markets to carriers should affect only the distribution of profits, not the joint
profitability of the outcomes.
10If sim · 100 is the market share in percentage units of carrier i in market m, the HHI is
P
Im
i=1
(sim · 100)
2,
where Im is the number of firms in market m.
11Nextel is not in the HHI calculation because it uses licenses converted from taxi dispatch use. Therefore, the
Sprint/Nextel merger does not contribute to Figure 4’s high HHI in 2005.
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Figure 4: Market Concentration: Population-Weighted Mean HHI in Terms of MHz
I now examine whether contracts are indeed a good substitute for mergers. In mobile
phones, roaming agreements achieve demand-side efficiencies by allowing customers to use
their phones in markets where their home carriers do not provide service. I want to exam-
ine whether roaming agreements are a good substitute for acquiring larger native coverage
areas through consolidation.
The technology to allow customers to use their phones outside of their native coverage areas
existed in some form since the near beginning of the industry, and almost all carriers allow
some sort of roaming. Therefore, a decision to allow roaming hinges on the demand side:
will allowing my customers to roam on others’ networks raise the number of subscribers,
and will allowing other carriers’ customers to roam on my network raise my revenue?
A problem with studying inter-firm agreements is that contracts are often private. Because
early mobile phones required manual intervention by users to activate roaming, informa-
17
Table 1: Native and Roaming Coverage for the Top Five Carriers in 1990
Carrier % of US served by % of US served by
native coverage native + roaming
McCaw Communications 24.9 87.9
GTE Mobilnet 14.2 99.8
NYNEXMobile 13.5 99.0
Southwestern Bell 13.4 99.5
PacTel Cellular 11.9 98.4
tion on roaming agreements was made public and easy to access. I have data on roaming
agreements between carriers in 1990 from the Cellular Travel Guide.
There are two main stylized facts from the 1990 roaming agreements. First, roaming agree-
ments are ubiquitous. Table 1 lists the five biggest carriers in 1990, the percentage of the
US population served by each carrier’s native coverage, and the percentage of the popula-
tion living in geographic markets where each carrier’s customers can use their phone, either
through roaming or native coverage.12 Four of the five carriers have near 100% coverage
through roaming agreements.13
The second stylized fact is that roaming is expensive for customers. The mean per-minute
fee for native coverage is $0.40 compared with roaming fee of $0.63, implying that the per-
minute fee for roaming is typically 55% greater than the per-minute fee for native customers.
The mean pro-rated daily fee for native coverage is $0.88, compared with $1.95 for roaming.
The roaming daily fee is 122% pricier than the daily fee for native customers. Such expensive
roaming coverage is a poor substitute for cheaper native coverage. Put together, the stylized
facts show that for customers roaming agreements mimic the native coverage areas but not
12For both native and total coverage, the denominator for the US population considers only residents living
in markets with active mobile phone service.
13In the complete data, a few firms lack roaming agreements, but I suspect this reflects noncompliance with
the survey more than a desire to not allow their customers to roam.
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the native fees associated with consolidated national carriers. Offering cheap, widespread
coverage seems to require mergers instead of inter-firm contracts.14
The key question is why roaming agreements have high fees attached to them, especially in
a world where customers do not a priori care whether their home carrier is offering native
or roaming coverage in an area.15
I see two major explanations. One is that consumers, or a large fraction of them, do not care
about large coverage areas. Subscribers who do not often travel and use their phones for lo-
cal calls may be in this category. Under this explanation, the high prices charged to roamers
may be a price discrimination scheme to charge higher prices to inelastic demanders such as
business travelers. A concern with this explanation is that merged carriers often charge the
same, lower fee for calls in the merged companies’ combined calling area. A firm seeking
to price discriminate would charge calls placed far away from a customer’s home market,
even if the carrier controls both markets.
Another explanation involves the theory of the firm: perhaps firm boundaries throw up
transactions costs that prohibit carriers from cooperating too closely. Firms do not want to
give a potential rival an advantage by offering a larger coverage area, so the equilibrium is
that firms can only offer low prices for traveling subscribers by merging and offering larger
native calling areas.
To some degree, the demand estimates in the next sections will address the first of these
explanations by measuring how much customers value national calling areas.
14The divergence between roaming and native charges persists. In 2004, AT&T and Cingular pointed to
lowering high roaming costs for customers as a justification to merge. The carriers did not mention that roaming
costs could be lowered by signing a contract without a merger.
15In 1998, AT&T offered the innovative Digital One Rate plan, where for $90 a month AT&T paid a customer’s
roaming fees. AT&T’s plan attracted enough new customers that AT&T had to buy new spectrum licenses to
increase capacity. Some sources suggest the high roaming fees caused AT&T to lose money on the plan.
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7 Demand Estimates of the Values of National Coverage Areas
The evidence of geographic consolidation of the wireless phone industry shows that many
recent mergers have increased concentrationwithin local markets. At the same time, the evi-
dence on the universality of reciprocal roaming agreements, yet the high per-minute charges
for roaming, suggest that carriers do not have a strong demand-side motive to offer cus-
tomers large native calling areas. This section follows-up on the other analyses by directly
estimating the willingness of customers to pay for national coverage areas.
Bajari, Fox and Ryan (2005) introduce a new aggregate data, semiparametric discrete choice
estimator. It allows a researcher to estimate the parameters in a micro-level random utility
model using data on overall choice probabilities. In demand estimation, choice probabili-
ties are known as market shares. The estimator is easy to implement and, importantly, is
semiparametric as it does not rely on specifying a functional form for the distribution of the
error terms.
Let the observed characteristics / features of a calling plan j be xj , and let its observed
monthly fee be pj . The utility if consumer i purchases plan j is
uij = x
′
jβ − pj + ǫij ,
where ǫij is an unknown individual and calling plan-specific shock. The consumer picks the
plan that gives the highest utility uij .
The goal of the econometric method is to estimate β, the willingness to pay in monetary
terms for the plan characteristics in xj . The estimator of β is any β that maximizes the
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objective function
J∑
j=1
J∑
k=1,k 6=j
1
[
x′jβ − pj > x
′
kβ − pk
]
× 1 [sj < sk]×
(
x′jβ − pk −
(
x′kβ − pk
))2
,
where 1 [·] is the indicator function, equal to 1 if the condition in brackets is true, and 0
otherwise. Here, sj is the market share of subscription plan j. The objective function asks
whether a calling plan j with a higher market share than another plan k has a higher payoff,
and if not, assigns a penalty equal to the difference between the payoffs. Bajari, Fox and
Ryan (2005) show that this estimator is consistent, and discuss the calling plan application
in more detail.
We do not actually have share data, but notice from the objective function that all is needed
is the relative ranking of shares, as in the term 1 [sj < sk]. The website Amazon lists, for each
cellular market, the rank orderings of the plans for sale in a given market. We use data from
Boston collected in September 2005. Note also that our estimator relies on only the pairwise
relative rankings of plans, so it is still consistent when consumers can choose plans that are
not offered on Amazon and that we have no data on.
Table 2 lists estimates of the willingness to pay for various plan characteristics. For the
purposes of this paper, the most important plan characteristic is whether plan offers na-
tional coverage, meaning coverage without roaming surcharges. Many carriers offer both a
regional and a national calling plan; identification mainly comes from the variation in de-
mand for national calling versus regional calling plans for the same carrier, as opposed to
differences in the calling plans across carriers. Estimates of the value of national coverage
are similar when carrier indicators are included in the analysis.
Table 2 suggests that a national coverage area is worth around $1.90 a month to a typical
customer. This works out to under $24 a year. Given that carriers can spend hundreds of
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Table 2: Estimates of the Willingness to Pay for Plan Characteristics from Bajari, Fox and
Ryan (2005)
Characteristic Value in Monthly Fee Dollars
National Coverage $1.90
# Anytime Minutes $0.0272 per minute
Activation Fee ($) -$0.283
Unlimited in-Network Calling -$0.0213
Family Plan $9.09
Additional Line Charge ($) $0.0218
Unlimited Internet $4.73
Rollover Minutes (Y/N) -$6.57
Blackberry Email $6.30
Free Incoming Calls $1.80
Walkie-Talkie Radio $7.00
Unlimited Off-Peak Minutes $6.72
dollars in subsidized handsets and other inducements to enroll a new subscriber for one or
two years, $24 a year seems like a small value. It does not appear offering typical customers
national coverage areas is a good explanation for the observed consolidation.
8 Conclusions
Typically, telecommunications industries are concentrated because of the actions of regula-
tors. By contrast, the regulator of the US wireless phone industry initially chose a highly
dispersed ownership structure, and consolidation happened over time through the volun-
tary mergers of carriers. Thus, the history of consolidation can be used to examine the
reasons for the consolidation.
Most importantly, this paper seeks to distinguish between scale and scope efficiencies and
the desire to exercise retail market as explanations for the consolidation. Initially, the gov-
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ernment prevented within market mergers, and consolidation mainly increased the geo-
graphic coverage of individual carriers. More recently, the government severely loosened
antitrust restrictions on within-market mergers, and many such mergers ensued. The large
amount of within-market mergers raises the concern that the desire to exploit retail market
power has been a motivating force.
Efficiencies can be on both the cost and demand sides. Two other parts of the paper present
evidence that most customers do not have large values for national coverage areas, so that
the demand side benefits of offering national coverage areas appear small. In the early cel-
lular industry, data on roaming agreements was public. Roaming agreements were almost
universal, meaning that any customer could place a call throughout the country. However,
the rates charged for roaming agreements were quite high, meaning that carriers chose not
to use contracts to create inexpensive national coverage areas for their customers. As cre-
ating such a national coverage area without mergers would have been relatively easy, one
might suspect that customers do not value national coverage areas greatly.
I also examined demand data on calling plans offered on Amazon. Estimates show that
customers are willing to pay $1.90 a month (around $24 a year) for a national, rather than
regional, calling area. Compared to annual bills in the hundreds of dollars, $24 seems like a
small valuation for a national calling area. It is likely business travelers have a much higher
valuation for national coverage areas, but a small segment of customers is unlikely to drive
consolidation.
Preliminary evidence suggests that demand-side synergies from offering greater calling ar-
eas is a poor explanation for consolidation. The remaining explanations are cost-side syner-
gies, both within and across markets, and the desire to exploit retail market power in local
markets. Further work will seek to distinguish between the remaining explanations.
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